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Denny et al.: Damages--Inadequacy of Verdict
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

1966), must include all crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.
This question has previously arisen in the area of bail. Capital
offenses are not bailable, but it has been held that the abolition
of capital punishment makes all persons charged with a crime
bailable. 8 AM. JuR. 2d Bail and Recognizance §§ 30-31 (1963).
What this seems to be saying is that by abolishing capital punishment, the difference between capital offenses and other crimes
is also abolished. By statutory interpretation the West Virginia
court was able to reach an opposite result in the principal case.
Damages-Inadequacy of Verdict
P brought action to recover for property damage to her automobile and for personal injuries sustained in a rear end collision
negligently caused by D while P was waiting to turn at an intersection. P's husband, H, sought to recover for medical expenses
and loss of consortium occasioned by P's injuries. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of P but against H in disregard of instruction,
and judgment was entered thereon. A motion by P and H to set
aside the verdict and judgment on the grounds of inadequacy and
as showing, passion, prejudice, bias, or misconception of the law
was overruled. Held, affirmed as to P, reversed and remanded as
to H. Evidence of liability must be uncontroverted in order to
set aside a verdict. Furthermore, the jury having found in favor
of P, H became entitled as a matter of law to recover on his
derivative claim. Coakley v. Marple, 156 S.E.2d 11 (W. Va. 1967).
One of the issues which arose in this case concerned cricumstances under which a jury verdict for plaintiff may be set aside
on grounds of inadequacy. The court looked to Shipley v. Virginian Railway Co., 87 W. Va. 139, 104 S.E. 297 (1920), which
established the rule that the court may not set aside a verdict
because of inadequacy if the evidence is such that had the verdict
been for D the court could not set it aside. Since P's right to
recovery was a jury question in the principal case, the court did
not have the right to decide on its adequacy.
Another issue arising was the jury's apparent disregard for an
instruction. The trial court instructed that if they found for P,
they must also find for H and consider his damages. The court
found that the denial of recovery constituted a reversible error
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citing its recent decision in Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W. Va.
595, 136 S.E.2d 877 (1964).
Disbarment-Evasion of Federal Income Tax
Defendant was previously convicted of a felony for willful
violation of the Internal Revenue Code. He was then brought
before the court in a disciplinary proceeding based on the By-laws
of the West Virginia State Bar which require that an attorney's
license to practice law "shall" be revoked should he be convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude. Held, willful evasion of payment of income tax is a crime involving moral turpitude and the
by-laws make license revocation mandatory precluding the court
from considering extenuating circumstances. In Re Mann, 154
S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1967).
Refusing to consider extenuating circumstances would appear to
place West Virginia in a minority position. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d
1398 (1958). The court states the weight of authority is that a
conviction involving the element of fraud is one involving moral
turpitude. However, such conviction does not necessarily dictate
disbarment because the majority will give the defendant an opportunity to show himself free of moral turpitude by considering
extenuating circumstances. This is true even in situations where
the statutory language is similar to West Virginia's. Baker v.
Miller, 236 Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d 145 (1956); Re Halinan,43 Cal. 2d
243,272 P.2d 768 (1954).
Procedure-Unincorporated Associations
D, a county circuit court, issued a preliminary injunction against
P-relator, an unincorporated labor union, enjoining P from engaging in unlawful picketing. P then sought a writ of prohibition to
prohibit D from perpetuating the preliminary injunction on the
grounds that P, an unincorporated association, is not subject to
suit in its name or as a separate entity. Held, an unincorporated
association may not sue or be sued in its name or as a separate
entity in absence of a statute authorizing such suits. But, an unincorporated association may still protect its rights against third
persons by maintaining an action in the name of the State, which
acts in a representative capacity. Therefore, P-relatorhas properly
maintained this action in the name of the State. Both P and the
State have a bona fide interest in this proceeding, P's interest
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